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GUILTY PLEAS, BRADY DISCLOSURE,
AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Kevin C. McMunigalt
This symposium focuses on the role that prosecutorial violations of
the disclosure obligations imposed by Brady v. Maryland play in
wrongful convictions. Other authors published in this symposium
examine the connection between Brady violations and wrongful
convictions primarily in the context of trials. The purpose of this
article, by contrast, is to explore a connection between prosecutorial
failures to disclose Brady material and wrongful convictions in the
context of guilty pleas, the primary procedural vehicle our criminal
justice system uses for securing criminal convictions.
The duty imposed by Brady v. Maryland presents some similar
challenges in both the trial and guilty plea contexts. One is the
practical question of how to enforce disclosure obligations when
prosecutors and police often have sole access to files containing
Brady material. For the same reason, it is difficult to determine or
even estimate how often disclosure obligations are violated. And if a
failure to disclose is revealed after a conviction, how should lawyers
and judges approach the often difficult counter-factual question of
whether the outcome of a trial or guilty plea decision would have
been altered by disclosure?
One facet of current discussions of Brady in the context of guilty
pleas, though, is distinct from discussions of Brady in the trial setting.
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny clearly impose a due process duty
on prosecutors to disclose in cases in which guilt is determined
through trial. In contrast, whether Brady applies when guilt is
determined by guilty plea has been and continues to be uncertain.
t Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. I thank Ben Malbasa for his thorough research on and thoughtful assistance with this
project.
373 U.S. 87 (1963).
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This article has three objectives. The first is to provide an
overview of the development and current status of the law on the
question of whether Brady v. Maryland applies in the context of
guilty pleas. The second is to set forth the reasons why I fear that
failure to disclose Brady material in the guilty plea context
contributes to wrongful convictions.2 My final objective is briefly to3
critique Justice Breyer's majority opinion in United States v. Ruiz,
the only United States Supreme Court case to date that has addressed
Brady in the guilty plea context.
I.
My experience working as an Assistant United States Attorney in
the criminal division of a major metropolitan U.S. Attorney's Office
sparked my interest in Brady and guilty pleas. I observed that pre-trial
exchanges among prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges routinely
addressed Brady disclosure. Defense lawyers requested, prosecutors
agreed, and judges nodded approvingly. But when cases ended in a
negotiated guilty plea, as they typically did, the legal fate of Brady
requests was uncertain. The judge presented the defendant, often
orally and in writing, with a list of the rights the defendant was
explicitly waiving by choosing to plead guilty. Disclosure under
Brady v. Maryland was not included in that litany. And neither
prosecutor nor defense counsel said anything about Brady disclosure.
When I began writing about Brady and guilty pleas, I asked a
number of defense lawyers and prosecutors if they ever explicitly
addressed Brady disclosure during the negotiation or entry of a guilty
plea. Defense lawyers typically said they did not, because they felt it
was obvious that the prosecutor was obligated to disclose Brady
material to the defense prior to entry of a guilty plea. Prosecutors also
typically stated that they did not explicitly raise Brady disclosure
during the negotiation or entry of a guilty plea. But prosecutors
explained that they did not do so because, in their view, it was
obvious the prosecutor was not obligated to turn Brady material over
prior to entry of a guilty plea. From their perspective, entry of a guilty
plea implicitly waived all trial rights, and they saw Brady disclosure
as exclusively a trial right.
My observations that those involved in the guilty plea process
routinely failed to address Brady and that prosecutors and defense
lawyers failed to do so based on diametrically opposed views of
2 I first articulated the arguments in Section I1 in an earlier article, Kevin C. McMunigal,
Disclosure andAccuracy in the Guilty Plea Process,40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989).
536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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Brady's applicability to guilty pleas may have reflected the state of
the law at the time. In 1989, when I first wrote about Brady and guilty
pleas, 4 few courts had addressed the issue. The courts that had
addressed it had come to different conclusions about whether Brady
applied in the guilty plea process. 5 In light of this scarce and divided
authority, both the view expressed to me by defense counsel and the
view expressed by prosecutors about Brady's applicability to guilty
pleas were plausible. In short, few practioners, judges, or academics
at that time had given attention to the issue of Brady's application to
guilty pleas.
Thirteen years later, when a case dealing with Brady and guilty
pleas first came before the United States Supreme Court, that
situation had changed. By 2002, a large number of federal and state
cases had confronted the issue, with the majority recognizing that
prosecutors do have a due process duty to disclose Brady material
prior to the entry of a guilty plea. Federal Courts of Appeals in the
Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits adopted this view,6 along with a
federal district court in the Fourth Circuit. 7 State appellate courts in
South Carolina, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Idaho,
Georgia, and Texas had also applied Brady to guilty pleas.8 In

contrast, the Federal Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit had held
4 See McMunigal, supranote 2.

5 Compare Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding the
prosecution's non-disclosure of Brady material during plea bargaining "certainly objectionable,"
but noting that "there is no authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of Brady
material priorto trial amounts to a deprivation of due process.") and United States v. Wolczik,
480 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("a defendant cannot expect to obtain Brady material
for use in a pretrial decision to plead guilty") with Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 598
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (refusing to overturn the guilty plea conviction in the case due to lack of
prejudice, but stating that "[i]n order to maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process and
to assure that a guilty plea entered by a defendant is done so voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, a prosecutor has a duty, during the course of plea bargaining, to disclose to the
defendant evidence that is as clearly exculpatory of certain elements of the crime charged as is
the contested evidence in this case.") aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (1977); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131,
134-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that when "exculpatory evidence existed at the time of the
guilty plea which reasonably would have led the defendant not to so plead" and "was known to
and suppressed by the prosecutor ... the defendant should be entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea.") and Ex ParteLewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("We hold that the
prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable information (whether relating to the issue of competence,
guilt, or punishment) extends to defendants who plead guilty as well as to those who plead not
guilty.").
6 See Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448
(9' Cir. 1995); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491 (1994).
7 See Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688 (E.D.Va. 1996).
' See Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515 (1999); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); State v. Parsons, 775 A. 2d 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State v. Davis, 823
S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999);
Carroll v. State, 464 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1994); Exparte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697.
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that Brady does not apply in the guilty plea context. 9 Lower courts in
some states had divided on the question.
In the past twenty years, the academic literature also has given
Brady and guilty pleas greater attention. The first articles I found
addressing Brady and guilty pleas appeared in 1981.10 In the
intervening 26 years, Professor Douglass," Professor Lain, 12 and I,
along with a number of student authors,' 3 have written on the issue.
As with judges, the majority of academic commentators have
supported requiring Brady disclosure prior to guilty pleas.
In 2002, the Supreme Court finally addressed Brady in the guilty
plea context. With little analysis and less hesitation, the Court
severely restricted, and left open the possibility of entirely rejecting,
application of Brady to guilty pleas. In doing so, the Court neither
addressed nor noted the substantial body of federal and state case law
supporting application of Brady to guilty pleas. Though the precise
scope of the Ruiz decision is subject to ambiguity, there is little
question that the case marks a significant restriction of Brady rights in
the guilty plea context and runs counter to the trend in lower federal
and state courts prior to Ruiz.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz, the American
College of Trial Lawyers proposed modifying Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 to impose a duty to disclose exculpatory
information in the guilty plea context. 14 This proposal has not been
adopted by the Federal Rules Committee.
II.
The past ten years have provided vivid lessons on why we need to
be concerned about wrongful convictions in our criminal justice
system. Cases in which DNA evidence demonstrated wrongful
9 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.2000).
10Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Casefor Prep Plea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581
(1981); Lee Sheppard, Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v.
Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J.CRiM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981).
11John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining,50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001).
12 Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea
Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2002).
13 See Shane M. Cahill, United States v. Ruiz, Are Plea Agreements Conditionedon Brady
Waivers Unconstitutional?,32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1 (2002); Erica G. Franklin, Waiving
ProsecutorialDisclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery"
Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1999); David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair
Dealing: A Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
3005 (1999).
14 American College of Trial Lawyers, Proposal:Proposed Codification of Disclosure of
FavorableInformation Under FederalRules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRM. L.
REv. 93 (2004).
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convictions revealed a host of sources of inaccuracy in criminal trials.
Among these have been failures by police and prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory information, the use of jailhouse informants, eyewitness
identification error, inadequate legal representation, inadequate access
to scientific expertise and resources, misuse of scientific evidence,
coerced confessions, and the psychological phenomenon of escalation
of commitment. 15 Though trials produced most of the erroneous
convictions revealed so far by DNA, the factors causing inaccuracy
are not limited to the trial context. Rather, they operate in both the
trial and guilty plea contexts.
Inadequate representation by defense counsel, for example,
plagues guilty pleas as well as trials. Adequacy of representation is
likely an even greater problem in the guilty plea context than the trial
context. Retained defense lawyers are typically paid less if a case
ends in a guilty plea rather than a trial, often in the form of a flat fee.
Defense counsel, therefore, have less financial incentive to
thoroughly investigate and prepare the case when he knows the
defendant will accept a plea offer. Aside from the financial incentive,
trial by its very nature prompts greater investigation and preparation
than a guilty plea. A trial, because it involves detailed presentation
and examination of witnesses and exhibits, is more likely to expose
poor preparation by defense counsel than a guilty plea hearing, at
which defense counsel plays a minimal role and the only source of
evidence is the defendant. Inadequate representation that becomes
public at a trial may lead to embarrassment, damage to reputation
with judges and peers, malpractice liability, disciplinary sanction, and
reversal on appeal. Such risks from inadequate representation if the
client pleads guilty are dramatically less than if the client's case goes
to trial. Plea negotiation pressures from prosecutors to resolve cases
quickly and have defendants forego discovery and disclosure rightsas in Ruiz "fast track" pleas discussed in Section III, belowreinforce incentives for defense counsel not to adequately investigate
and prepare a client's case if the client pleads guilty.
In the trial context, rush to judgment and escalation of
commitment can turn witnesses, police officers, and prosecutors into
unwitting contributors to a wrongful conviction when they form an
early opinion about a person's guilt and then refuse to look for or
consider later evidence inconsistent with that opinion. Rather than
reexamine a position, they tend to escalate their commitment to it. In
the guilty plea context, both the defense lawyer and, oddly enough in
15 See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Commentary, Brady's Brainteaser:
The Accidental Prosecutor
and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 575 (2007).
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some cases, the defendant himself may be subject to the same
psychological phenomenon and become unwitting contributors to a
wrongful conviction.
A false coerced confession may undermine the accuracy of a guilty
plea as well as the accuracy of a jury verdict. A confession, whether
false or not, increases the likelihood of conviction at trial. Therefore,
it will simultaneously increase the pressure for a defendant to plead
guilty, whether innocent or not.
What about Brady violations? Is there reason to believe that the
failure to disclosure Brady material contributes to factually inaccurate
guilty pleas? Failure to disclose exculpatory information at trial
means jurors will render a decision without that information and thus
be more likely to render an inaccurate verdict. But there is no jury at a
guilty plea hearing. Does access to exculpatory information help
assure that a defendant's admission of guilt at a guilty plea hearing is
accurate?
The most plausible and intuitively appealing, but ultimately
misguided, response to the question of whether Brady disclosure aids
accuracy in guilty pleas is that it does not. Two factors prompt such a
response. First, it is appealing to assume that a defendant entering a
guilty plea, unlike a juror at a trial, knows whether or not he "did it"
without having to rely, as jurors must, on evidence, including
exculpatory evidence, outside his own perceptions and memories. A
second appealing assumption is that a defendant is very unlikely to
plead guilty falsely in open court. After all, the defendant is aware
that his factual statements admitting guilt in a guilty plea hearing are
against penal and social interest, having been warned by the judge
both that an admission of guilt at the hearing is the basis for a
criminal conviction and that potentially harsh consequences follow a
criminal conviction. In addition, such statements are made after
having received advice of counsel and are often made under oath and
penalty of perjury.
Undoubtedly most defendants who plead guilty know, and can
therefore accurately establish, the facts determining their criminal
liability and are sincere when they confess their guilt in a guilty plea.
My arguments in the remainder of this section aim to demonstrate,
though, that an unknown but likely troubling number of defendants
pleading guilty probably lack such knowledge and sincerity and that
we should examine closely our assumptions about defendant
knowledge and sincerity in the guilty plea context. Once we
understand the knowledge and sincerity risks posed by guilty pleas,
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we can see how Brady disclosure in the guilty plea context helps
reduce those risks.
A. Knowledge
The notion that a defendant knows whether or not he "did it"-that
is, whether or not he or she engaged in an act that fulfills the conduct
element of the charged offense-is undoubtedly true in most cases.
But it is not true in all cases. Moreover, the fact that a defendant
knows if he engaged in the conduct required for a crime does not
mean that the defendant has adequate knowledge about other
elements of the crime or other factors that may be critical in
determining criminal liability. The view that because a defendant
knows if he "did it" he can reliably determine through admissions at a
plea hearing all facts critical to establishing liability is flawed. It is
based on unexamined assumptions and reflects a highly restricted,
simplistic view of guilt and innocence as based solely on conduct. It
ignores many of the factors our substantive criminal law uses to
define criminal liability, such as circumstances, results, causation,
mental state, and defenses.
In an earlier article, I analyzed in detail the potential weaknesses in
a defendant's knowledge concerning facts that may determine
criminal liability and provided examples of situations in which the
defendant is not a reliable witness for establishing her own criminal
liability.16 Cases that have occurred since I wrote that article provide
further examples of such knowledge deficiencies and reinforce the
need for Brady disclosure in the guilty plea context.
The defendant in State v. Gardner" was charged with vehicular
manslaughter after the car he was driving crossed the center line of a
highway and ran into an oncoming truck, killing one person and
seriously injuring three others. Tests indicated that Gardner was under
the influence of marijuana and sleep deprived. Gardner pled guilty,
stating at the hearing that "he could not remember anything about the
accident and believed that he might have fallen asleep while driving
because he had not slept the previous night.' 8 The sentence imposed
was ten years, with a four year minimum. But Gardner turned out to
have been wrong about causing the collision. Because the prosecution
had not disclosed it to him, Gardner did not know that evidence
indicated his front tire had blown out and that the tire failure, rather

16

See McMunical, supra note 2, at 970-84.

17 126 Idaho 428, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Court of Appeals).

18Id. at 1147.
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than an act on his part, had caused his car to swerve into oncoming
traffic.
A witness, in a car following Gardner's car at the time of the
accident, observed the left front tire of Gardner's car blow out,
causing the accident. A written statement given by the witness to the
Idaho State Police stated: "when the blue car [Gardner's vehicle] was
about ten feet in front of the truck I believe the driver's front tire
blew. The whole [sic] jumped into the oncoming lane like it was on
rails." 19 In a deposition, "the witness further explained that he
observed the left-front tire blowing out. He saw a puff of dust and
rock chunks that appeared to have been caused by the tire blowing,
then the car immediately jerked to the left., 20 The Idaho court of
appeals found that the Brady disclosure duty applies to guilty pleas,
that the prosecution's failure to disclose the report violated this duty,
and vacated Gardner's guilty plea.
The Gardner case is an excellent example of a defendant who
thought he had done something that caused another person's death,
but was mistaken. He did not have adequate knowledge to establish
the facts that determined his liability. Without disclosure of the
witness report, he would have been wrongly convicted and served a
prison term of at least four years. Brady disclosure was key to
preventing and remedying a wrongful homicide conviction and
significant wrongful imprisonment.
In addition to illustrating the importance of disclosure in the guilty
plea context, Gardner suggests that other factors associated with
wrongful convictions also may have played a role in Gardner's guilty
plea. One is adequacy of representation. The name and address of the
exonerating witness in Gardner were listed on an accident report
attached to the complaint, which would have been provided to
defense counsel early in the case. There is no indication in the
reported opinion that defense counsel interviewed the witness prior to
Gardner pleading guilty. Instead, it appears that the exculpating
witness's testimony came to the defense lawyer's attention as a
byproduct of later civil litigation arising from the collision. A fairly
cursory examination of Gardner's car after the accident also would
have revealed evidence of the tire blowout.
Rush to judgment and escalation of commitment may also have
played a role in Gardner's wrongful guilty plea conviction. The
evidence in the case early on revealed that Gardner was under the
influence of marijuana at the time of the accident. Given the

2007] PLEAS, BRADY DISCLOSURE, AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

659

defendant's uncertainty about what happened, it appears that not only
the police and prosecutor, but also defense counsel and even the
defendant himself, formed early judgments about the defendant's
conduct having caused the collision and refused to seek or consider
evidence inconsistent with those judgments, such as the possibility of
tire failure having caused the collision.
Carroll v. State,21 a Georgia case, provides another example of a
defendant who pled guilty when she did not know key facts for
determining her criminal liability. Like Gardner, the case involved a
homicide charge arising out of an automobile wreck. In Carroll,
though, only a single car was involved. The defendant was the 19year-old driver of a car in which two adults and a toddler were
passengers. During a heavy rainstorm, Carroll lost control of the car,
which went off the road, turned over, and ejected one of the
passengers; who died. Neither alcohol nor drugs were involved.
The officer who investigated the accident scene was taking-but
had yet to complete-his first class in accident reconstruction.
Despite his lack of qualifications, he nonetheless concluded in a
written "information sheet" and in his testimony at a preliminary
hearing, that the defendant's speed was 70 mph in a 35 mph zone and
that the condition of the road and its shoulder "had no impact on the
accident." Without independent knowledge of her exact speed, the
road conditions, and what caused her to lose control of the car,
Carroll pled guilty, relying on the officer's "expert" conclusions.
The investigating officer's conclusions about speed and the role of
road conditions in causing the wreck turned out to be unsupported by
the evidence collected at the scene of the wreck. An experienced
accident reconstruction expert-the instructor teaching the accident
reconstruction course in which the investigating officer was
enrolled-reviewed the investigating officer's work. Days before the
defendant pled guilty, the experienced examiner concluded that it was
not possible to calculate the speed of Carroll's car based on the data
the investigating officer had collected and that in his view, the
condition of the road had played a role in what he viewed as an
accident. As in Gardner, a defendant erroneously pled guilty because
she simply did not know facts critical to determining her criminal
liability. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed Carroll's conviction
and allowed her to withdraw her guilty plea.
The Carrollcase also strongly suggests that lack of defense access
to an independent expert witness, a factor associated with wrongful

21

222 Ga. App. 560, 474 S.E. 2d 737 (1996).
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convictions at trial,22 played a role in Carroll's guilty plea. Nothing in
the reported opinion indicates that defense counsel in Carroll
obtained an independent accident reconstruction analysis that could
have revealed the errors in the investigating officer's conclusions
about speed and road conditions. Rather, his client pled guilty in
reliance on erroneous "expert" analysis provided by the state. If the
experienced expert working for the state had not reviewed the
investigating officer's reconstruction analysis, there is no indication
that the errors in that analysis would otherwise have been revealed.
Both Gardner and Carroll illustrate that there are situations in
which disclosure of Brady material in the guilty plea context is just as
crucial to an accurate determination of criminal liability as it is in the
trial context.
B. Sincerity
Lack of sincerity on the defendant's part in pleading guilty, in my
view, is likely an even more pervasive source of inaccuracy in guilty
pleas than defects in a defendant's knowledge. In other words, rather
than defendants pleading guilty because they wrongly but sincerely
think they are guilty, as in Gardner and Carroll,defendants may also
falsely condemn themselves when they know they are not guilty. My
concern about sincerity arises from the incentives influencing both
prosecutors and defendants in plea negotiations. As I argued at length
in my previous article, cases in which Brady material exists are
particularly prone to creating incentives that encourage false selfcondemnation.
If a prosecutor discovers the existence of Brady material, the most
likely response is to dismiss the case for legal, ethical and strategic
reasons. If the prosecutor does not dismiss, the next most likely
response is to attempt to resolve the case through a guilty plea,
especially if no obligation to disclose exculpatory information applies
in the guilty plea context. If the prosecutor chooses to plea bargain,
the existence of Brady material she is obligated to disclose if the case
goes to trial creates a powerful incentive to offer a high sentencing
differential. This in turn creates a powerful incentive for an innocent
defendant to plead guilty.
Consider the following scenario. The government indicts a
defendant on an armed robbery charge arising from a violent
mugging. The prosecution's case is based entirely on the testimony of
the victim, who identified the defendant from police photographs of
22

(2007).

See Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 593
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persons with a record of similar violent crime. With only the victim's
testimony to rely on, the prosecutor is unsure of her ability to obtain a
conviction at trial. She offers the defendant a guilty plea limiting his
sentencing exposure to five years, a significant concession in light of
the defendant's substantial prior record and the fact that the charged
offense carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years incarceration. As
trial nears, the victim's confidence in the identification appears to
wane. The robbery took place at night. He was frightened and saw his
assailant for a matter of seconds. The victim refuses to talk to the
defense, but confides to the prosecutor his fear of a mistake in the
photo identification. He is now unsure if the man he picked from the
police photographs is the man who robbed him. On the eve of trial,
the defendant responds to the prosecutor's plea offer. He indicates
that he is willing to plead guilty if the prosecutor will limit the
sentence to one year. Is the prosecutor free to accept a guilty plea
without disclosing the victim's statement of uncertainty about the
identification?
In this scenario, the existence of exculpatory information
weakening the prosecutor's case creates an incentive for the
prosecutor to offer a very large discount on the potential sentence,
from 15 years to 1 year. This discount in turn creates a very large
incentive for false self-condemnation. In short, we should expect to
find cases with Brady information diverted by prosecutors from the
trial to the guilty plea arena. We should also expect prosecutors in
such cases to offer these sorts of sentencing differentials that
undermine confidence in the defendant's admission of guilt.
State v. Johnson,23 a 1989 Louisiana Court of Appeal case,
strongly suggests that the defendant in the case pled guilty to charges
he did not, in fact, commit and that the failure to disclose exculpatory
information contributed to that plea. Johnson was charged with
selling illegal drugs to the same undercover police officer on two
occasions, September 12 and October 11. The undercover officer
testified that the same person sold her the drugs on both occasions
and that there was no doubt in her mind on this question. She also
testified that Johnson was that individual, despite the fact that "there
were glaring differences" '24 between Johnson's appearance and the
officer's prior descriptions of the drug seller. The defendant testified,
as did his mother and fiance, that he was elsewhere at the time of the
offenses. After his fianc6 testified, the prosecution showed the
defense an arrest report on an unrelated offense that contradicted his
23
24

544 So.2d 767 (1989).
Id. at 771.
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alibi defense on one of the charges. In response, the defendant pled
guilty to one of the drug offenses in return for dismissal of the other
charge and an agreement not to bring perjury charges against him, his
mother or his fiancd. He received a sentence of six year at hard labor
on the charge to which he pled guilty.
But state records later revealed that Johnson had an apparently
unimpeachable alibi for one of the offenses. He was in state custody
at the time of the offense and thus could not have committed that
offense. And the undercover officer's complete certainty that the
same man committed both crimes indicated that Johnson had not
committed the other offense either. The Louisiana court set aside the
guilty plea, conviction, and sentence.
The facts in Johnson suggest powerful incentives operating on the
defendant to falsely condemn himself. Not only did the defendant
avoid conviction on a charge, but he avoided the threat of perjury
charges against himself, his mother and his fianc& The undercover
officer's misidentification of Johnson, despite confidence in her
identification and glaring discrepancies from her prior descriptions of
the seller, are a hallmark of erroneous conviction cases.
III.
To assess the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in United States v.
Ruiz, it is helpful to understand the context in which the case arose.
As mentioned above, during the 1990's there was a strong trend in the
lower federal and state courts applying Brady v. Maryland to guilty
pleas. In a 1995 case, Sanchez v. United States,25 the Ninth Circuit
became part of this trend. Despite the development of a split in the
circuits on this question, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in
a case directly addressing whether Brady applies to guilty pleas.
After the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sanchez that a defendant
pleading guilty retains Brady rights-that such rights are not
automatically or implicitly waived by entry of a guilty plea-the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California
incorporated an express waiver of Brady rights in what were termed
"fast track" plea agreements. These agreements made an express
waiver of Brady a condition for a defendant to receive a reduction in
sentence. The express waiver, though, was not complete. The
defendant waived the right to receive Brady material that constituted
impeachment information or was relevant to an affirmative defense.
But under the agreement, the prosecution agreed to turn over "any
25 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
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[known] information
establishing the factual innocence of the
26
defendant.
The express waiver at issue in Ruiz thus restricted Brady
disclosure in two ways. First, it limited the theories of relevance
requiring disclosure, excluding information relevant to impeachment
and affirmative defenses and including only information bearing on
"factual innocence." Neither the fast track agreement nor the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ruiz identified the theories of relevance that fall
within the phrase "factual innocence."
The second way in which the fast track agreement restricted Brady
disclosure was by significantly raising the persuasiveness threshold
triggering disclosure of information bearing on "factual innocence."
Under the Brady rule, information must be turned over only if it is
material. The Supreme Court's most recent iterations of the Brady
rule define material as creating "a reasonable probability that the
government's suppression [of the information] affected the outcome
of the case. 27 In other words, the information "could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict., 28 In short, information in the trial context
must be disclosed if it is likely to create reasonable doubt in the mind
of a juror.
In contrast, the disclosure obligation set forth in the plea
agreements approved by the Supreme Court in Ruiz required
disclosure only if the information establishes factual innocence. The
phrase "establishing factual innocence" indicates that to warrant
disclosure, the exculpatory information must have greater persuasive
force than required by the Brady materiality standard in the trial
context. In essence, rather than creating reasonable doubt about guilt,
the information must prove innocence in order to mandate disclosure.
As with the meaning of factual innocence, the level of persuasiveness
required for a particular item of favorable information to establish
factual innocence (e.g., a preponderance standard, a clear and
convincing standard, or a beyond reasonable doubt standard) was not
clarified by the fast track agreement or the Supreme Court's Ruiz
opinion.
The defendant in Ruiz challenged the validity of this express Brady
waiver as a condition to a plea agreement, the Ninth Circuit found the
express waiver unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court granted
review. The Court consequently addressed Brady's application to
26 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
27 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
28

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
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guilty pleas for the first time in a case that presented the issue
obliquely rather than directly.
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit and approved the
fast track plea agreements at issue in the case. That much is clear. But
Justice Breyer did not limit his opinion to considering the issue of
express waiver. Rather, he addressed also the issue of implicit waiver
and found that defendants pleading guilty have no right to disclosure
of Brady information relevant either to impeachment or an affirmative
defense. Although he did not explicitly state a conclusion about what,
if any, right to disclosure of exculpatory information a defendant
pleading guilty retains, the Court approved the fast track plea
agreement at issue in Ruiz with its highly restrictive disclosure
obligation regarding exculpatory information bearing on "factual
innocence." Thus, in Ruiz, the Supreme Court either extinguished or
severely restricted the right of a defendant pleading guilty to receive
every category of Brady information.
In my view, the Supreme Court got it wrong in Ruiz. The
restriction it approves of any prosecutorial obligation to disclose
Brady material in the context of plea bargaining is bad public policy
and bad constitutional law. The Court's reasoning in support of this
result is both superficial and flawed.
I will not offer here a detailed critique of Ruiz, but simply note
some of the weaknesses in the opinion. One flaw in the Court's
analysis is its failure even to acknowledge, much less consider, the
substantial body of case law from both the federal circuits and the
state courts applying Brady in the context of guilty pleas, the primary
thrust of which is contrary to the Court's conclusion. Nor did the
Court acknowledge any of the academic commentary or the
arguments advanced in that commentary on the issue of Brady
disclosure in the guilty plea context. Again, the primary thrust of the
academic commentary, like the existing case authority, was contrary
to the result reached by the court. The court's failure to acknowledge
or address both prior authority and academic commentary contrary to
the court's position seriously undermines the persuasiveness of its
analysis.
Gross overstatement of the burdens that disclosure of Brady
material in the guilty plea context would impose on the government is
another flaw in the Ruiz opinion. Throughout his review of these
potential burdens, Justice Breyer ignores the materiality limitation on
Brady disclosure that severely restricts what the government must
produce and thus limits the burden of producing it. Despite the fact
that the hemming in of the constitutional disclosure obligation
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through the development of a strict materiality requirement is perhaps
the dominant theme in the Supreme Court's line of Brady cases, the
Court treats the mandating of Brady disclosure in the guilty plea
context as the functional equivalent of mandating open file discovery.
The Court accepts, for example, the entirely implausible argument,
apparently advanced by the government, that the burden of Brady
disclosure might require the prosecution "to abandon its heavy
reliance upon plea bargaining." The implausibility of this argument is
demonstrated not only by the narrow definition of what qualifies as
Brady material, but also by the fact that prosecutors did not in fact
abandon plea bargaining in any of the federal circuits or states that
have mandated Brady disclosure in guilty pleas over the past few
decades.
The Court's review of these burdens reveals the Supreme Court's
lack of familiarity with the realities of discovery practice in federal
criminal cases. Justice Breyer points out, for example, the fact that the
Jencks Act authorizes disclosure of witness statements only after a
witness has testified. But federal trial judges routinely require the
disclosure of Jencks material in advance of trial in order to avoid
having to grant continuances during trials for defense counsel to
examine the statements for use in cross-examination. Prosecutors
routinely provide Jencks material well in advance of trial, as well as
witness statements that do not even qualify for disclosure under
Jencks or Rule 16, in order to convince defendants to plead guilty. So,
far from the "radical change" that Justice Breyer suggests would
result, requiring Brady disclosure would be a modest marginal
increase in the discovery burdens placed on prosecutors.
This symposium's focus, though, is on the relationship between
Brady and wrongful conviction. From this perspective, the primary
flaw in Ruiz is the Court's summary dismissal of any possible
connection between Brady disclosure and wrongful conviction
through guilty plea.
A. Affirmative Defenses
Justice Breyer devotes a single, short paragraph to exculpatory
information relating to affirmative defenses, and just a single sentence
to dismissing any need for disclosure of such information. In doing
so, he appears to accept without examination a view of innocence that
excludes consideration of long established and widely accepted
criminal law principles of justification and excuse embodied in
affirmative defenses. In relation to affirmative defense information,
he is unable to identify a single scenario in which requiring
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prosecutors to disclose Brady material in the context of guilty pleas
would provide any benefit to our criminal justice system, despite the
fact that cases from the lower federal and state courts, as well as
academic commentary, illustrate situations in which disclosure of
information relating to an affirmative defense can significantly
contribute to avoiding inaccuracy in guilty pleas.
One example would be a defendant failing to raise a valid
entrapment defense because the defendant and her lawyer do not
know that the person who enticed the defendant to commit the crime
was an agent of the government, either an undercover law
enforcement officer or a government informant. Such entrapment, in
which the defendant was unaware of the agency relationship between
the government and the person who enticed the defendant to act as a
drug runner, could quite plausibly exist in just the sort of case at issue
in Ruiz. Drug cases in which the prosecution wishes to avoid
revealing the sort of agency relationship required for an entrapment
defense are precisely the sort of cases in which the prosecution is
likely to seek a guilty plea and willingly offer a significant sentencing
differential to avoid such disclosure.
The insanity defense provides another example. The prosecution
might have records that show the defendant suffers from a mental
illness that would create the basis for an insanity defense. 29The
defendant might be incapable or unwilling to convey this information
to his lawyer. Especially if the prosecutor is pressing for a fast track
resolution, a valid insanity defense could well be missed without
prosecutorial disclosure of such records.
Provocation provides a third example of a defense the appropriate
application of which in the guilty plea context could hinge on
prosecutorial disclosure. Some jurisdictions limit the provocation
defense to certain victims. Maryland, for example, requires that "the
victim was the person who provoked the rage.",30 The defendant in
certain situations, such as a bar fight among strangers and involving
multiple participants, might well not know whether a person he killed
29

A case illustrating this scenario is Ex Parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697. The defendant,

Lewis, was charged with murder and the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. On the
same day as the appointment of counsel, Lewis pleaded guilty to the murder charge, later
receiving a sentence of five years to life. A letter from a state psychiatrist in the prosecutor's file
at the time of the guilty plea reported the results of a psychiatric examination of Lewis
conducted II days before the guilty plea. The report contained substantial indications of
Lewis's present incompetence and his insanity at the time of the offense, as well as suggestions
of mental retardation, alcohol abuse, and a basis for a claim of self-defense. The letter was not
disclosed during the guilty pea process. Id. at 699-700.
30 Dennis v. State, 105 Md. App. 687 (1995) (quoting Maryland State Bar Association
Committee on Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 4:17.4C).
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was in fact one of his provokers. 3 ' If the prosecution has evidence
showing that the victim was one of the provokers, such disclosure
could be critical for a defendant and his lawyer to accurately
determine the applicability of a provocation defense.
B. Impeachment
Justice Breyer similarly devotes only one sentence to the possible
connection between disclosure of impeachment information and the
factual accuracy of guilty pleas. He concludes that the prosecution's
obligation to turn over "information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant," along with Rule 11 's provisions on entry
of a guilty plea, "diminishes the force of Ruiz's concern that, in the
innocent individuals, accused
absence of impeachment information,
32
guilty.
plead
will
of crimes,
Impeachment is the process of challenging a witness with the
objective of weakening or entirely discrediting that witness's
testimony. By definition, then, impeachment information does not
directly prove or disprove guilt or innocence. But it can entirely
discredit or call into serious question the adequacy of proof of guilt.
Impeachment can take place through cross-examination of the
witness, referred to as intrinsic impeachment, or through other
witness testimony or documents, referred to as extrinsic
impeachment. In either form, but especially in its intrinsic form, it is a
process vividly associated with trials because of the potential drama
of a personal confrontation between accused and accuser. One might,
for this reason, erroneously conclude, as Justice Breyer does in Ruiz,
that impeachment evidence has no role to play in the guilty plea
process since witnesses are not cross-examined or challenged at a
guilty plea hearing. Indeed, a defendant who pleads guilty explicitly
waives the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
But when a defendant and defense counsel rely, during a guilty
plea hearing, on information previously provided by the prosecution,
rather than relying on the defendant's independent knowledge, to
establish an element of an offense or eliminate an affirmative defense,
revealing important impeachment information advances accuracy in
precisely the same way as it does at trial-by alerting the person
relying on the information provided by the government to weaknesses
in that information. In the trial context, the person placing reliance on
the witness is a juror or judge. In the guilty plea context, it is the
31 See State v. Lawton, 298 N.J. Super. 27 (1997), for a case presenting a provocation fact
pattern in which the defendant was mistaken about the identity of his attackers.
32 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631.
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defendant. In cases in which the defendant lacks knowledge,
disclosure of material impeachment can help guard against defendants
and defense lawyers erroneously relying on unreliable evidence when
pleading guilty.
The Carroll case, discussed previously, provides a good fact
pattern for illustrating the potential importance of impeachment
information in the guilty plea context. Assume that, in a vehicular
manslaughter case, the prosecution provides the defense with its
expert's report indicating the defendant driver was going 70 mph in a
35 mph speed zone and that driver negligence, rather than road
conditions, caused the car crash in which a passenger was killed. The
defendant is not sure how fast she was driving or what caused the car
to crash. Would revelation of any of the following impeachment items
help prevent a wrongful conviction through a guilty plea in which the
defendant and her lawyer rely on the assertions made in the expert's
report?
* The expert was inebriated at the time he made his
measurements or ran his calculations.
* The expert was shown to be suffering from a mental
impairment that compromised his ability to do his
measurements and calculations.
a The expert was about to be indicted for having falsified
test results in a large number of prior vehicular homicide
cases,33 always in favor of the prosecution's theory of the
case.

* A preliminary draft of the expert's report concluded that
the defendant was not speeding and that road conditions did
cause the crash. The measurement data in this early draft used
to support these conclusions indicate that the measurement
data in the final report given to the defense were altered by
the expert. Note that under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
most state evidence codes, these prior inconsistent statements
would be admissible solely to impeach and not for their truth
on the merits of the case.

33For an account of an expert who falsified test results in as many as 133 cases, see In re
W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, 438 S.E.2d 501 (W.Va. 1993) and Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse
of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997).

2007] PLEAS, BRADY DISCLOSURE, AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

669

* The expert had falsified his qualifications and was not in
fact qualified to make the expert conclusions set forth in his
report.
In each of these scenarios, the impeachment evidence would notify
the defendant and defense counsel of serious weaknesses in the
expert's conclusions. Just as informing a juror or judge of these
weaknesses at trial helps avoid an erroneous finding of fact,
informing the defendant and his lawyer of these weaknesses would
help avoid a wrongful admission of liability in the guilty plea context
based on a defendant's lack of knowledge about how fast she was
driving and what caused her car to crash.
Impeachment evidence also implicates the concern expressed in
Section II, above, about defects in sincerity compromising the
accuracy of guilty plea confessions. Impeachment evidence that
qualifies as material under Brady may weaken the prosecution's case
as significantly as exculpatory information bearing directly on an
element of an offense or an affirmative defense. A piece of
impeachment evidence that completely destroys the credibility of the
prosecution's primary witness, in other words, can be just as
debilitating to the prosecution as a DNA test eliminating the
defendant as a rapist or murderer. Accordingly, it can create just as
powerful an incentive for a prosecutor to avoid trial by disposing of a
case through a guilty plea and to offer a sentencing differential that
threatens to compromise the sincerity of a defendant's factual
admission of guilt. In the guilty plea context, disclosure of
impeachment information, just like disclosure of exculpatory
information bearing on an element, helps to nullify the threat to
accuracy posed by such a sentencing differential.
CONCLUSION

What are the prospects for mandating prosecutorial disclosure of
information favorable to the accused in the context of guilty pleas?
Prior to Ruiz, mandating such a disclosure duty grounded in due
process looked very promising as more and more state and lower
federal courts interpreted Brady v. Marylandas imposing such a duty.
But the Ruiz opinion and the attitude it reflects on the part of the
Supreme Court toward guilty pleas now make the prospect of
grounding such a prosecutorial duty in Brady v. Marylandbleak.
The most promising avenue to creating such a prosecutorial duty
in plea bargaining now appears to be pressing legislators either to
modify criminal procedure rules, as the American College of Trial
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lawyers has suggested, or creating a statutory disclosure duty, as
Congress did in the Jencks Act. One advantage of grounding such a
duty in a rule or statute rather than extending Brady v. Maryland is
that legislatures could shape that duty free of the unduly restrictive
materiality limits that have so closely cabined Brady v. Marylandand
kept it from fulfilling much of its promise. One disadvantage of the
rule or statutory approach is that Congress and each state legislature
would need to act individually to create such a duty for prosecutors
within each jurisdiction. Congress acting to modify the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure might spur state legislatures to act, especially
if a state's rules of criminal procedures are modeled, as many are, on
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We can also hope that the
notoriety of wrongful convictions exposed by DNA evidence will
move legislators to modify criminal procedure rules to require greater
prosecutorial disclosure in both the trial and guilty pleas settings.

